This study attempts to explore the link between corporate governance system developed by firms like promoter ownership, institutional relationship (as percentage ownership in the firm), foreign institutional investors (FII) ownership, board size (log assets), family control which is a significant indicator for board independence. Further we have also taken CEO duality, number of board meetings and busyness of directors and linked it with firm performance. Market based firm performance measures and accounting based performance show different impact. Findings indicate that impact of corporate governance variables on market based performance measures (Tobin's Q) is greater than the impact on accounting based performance measures (ROA and ROE). Ownership structure i.e. family capitalism impacts market based performance measures more whereas board structure impacts accounting based performance measure more. Among board variables, board size is found to impact performance positively and CEO duality is found to impact performance negatively.
Introduction
In this study, we study the impact of internal corporate governance-CG me-How to cite this paper: Kapil [6] ; Judge et al. [7] ; Gompers et al. [8] ; Pass [9] ; Bauer et al. [10] ; Bhagat and Bolton [11] ). Developing economies also witnessed empirical researches in corporate governance with their emergence. There are important organizational and behavioural differences between firms in emerging markets and those in developed markets. Governance quality, state ownership and financial development are critical institutional forces that shape the financing and governance of firms in emerging markets (Fan et al. [12] ). These institutional differences indicate that relationships obtained through data from developed economies may not be fully applicable to developing economies.
Corporate governance mechanisms have been found to be correlated with firm performance in various theoretical and empirical studies done in the context of emerging economies (Khanna and Palepu [13] [14] ; Gibson [15] ; Klapper and Love [16] ; Young et al. [17] ; Ehikioya [18] ; Claessens and Yurtoglu [19] ).
Well-functioning corporate governance mechanisms in emerging economies are of crucial importance for both local firms and foreign investors which are interested in pursuing the tremendous opportunities for investment and growth that such emerging economies provide (Rajagopalan and Zhang [20] ). From the perspective of local firms, evidences suggest that firms in emerging economies (compared with their counterparts in developed countries) are discounted in financial markets because of their weak governance (LaPorta et al. [21] ). Improvements in corporate governance can enhance investor confidence for firms in emerging economies and increase these firms' access to capital (Rajagopalan and Zhang [20] ).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review theoretical arguments as well as prior empirical evidence on relationship between corporate governance variables and firm performance and put forward our arguments for hypotheses development. This is followed by description of model, variables and their measures employed. After that, we present data descriptive followed by results and analysis. Finally, we conclude with discussion and point out future directions of study.
Corporate Governance in India
The Indian government initiated market reforms in 1991, which resulted in opening of the Indian economy to multinational and foreign investment. Increased foreign investment in India intensified the interest in good corporate governance and in particular the application of western governance structure to Indian firms (Jackling and Johl [21] ). India needed capital to finance the expansion of market spaces created by liberalization and outsourcing opportunities. Amongst other things this need of capital led to corporate governance reforms and major initiatives in this direction. The initial step in this direction was introduction of clause 49 in the listing agreement by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) which contained prominence of independent directors amongst other provisions.
Government of India took a major step in this direction by making provisions of Indian firms are predominantly of the family origin and promoter controlled (Varma [22] ; Chakrabarti et al. [23] ). Besides family ownership, other forms of domination, such as domination by government or a foreign group, also exist in Indian organizations. Additionally, promoters of companies often exercise influence that is disproportionate to their actual shareholding in the firm (Pande and Ansari [24] ).
In family owned corporations that widely prevail in emerging economies (like India), boards are typically dominated by family members who enjoy substantial ownership and control over the corporation and who often hold top executive positions with an objective of controlling the firm (Carney and Gadajlovic [25] ).
As an implication of the same, board members of family-controlled firms, in their role as monitors may not be that much efficient and may give benefit of doubt to incumbent mangers for low firm performance (Gomez-Mejia et al. [26] ). In case of Indian firms, families (founders) are present on the boards in 63.2 (65.5) percent and on an average, founders own over 50% of outstanding shares (Jameson et al., 2014) .
To overcome problems of corporate governance, different internal or external mechanisms can be applied (Dennis and McConnell [27] 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Firm performance may be improved by reducing agency problems through ownership concentration. Increased ownership stake increases incentive for block holders to monitor managerial behaviour (Shliefer and Vishny [1] ), because on the one hand it reduces the problem of free-rider associated with dispersed shareholding (Hart [35] ; Burkart et al. [36] ) and on the other hand large block holders can take effective concerted action against managerial misbehaviour.
However, the relationship between increased stake for block holders and firm performance is not always monotonically increasing, because after becoming too strong block holders may try to extract benefits more than their proportionate share that includes private benefits of control also (Holderness [37] ). Thus, value creation through ownership concentration will be a tradeoff between increased shared benefits created and private extraction of values (Mishra and
Kapil [38] ).
Increase in value of firm and reduction in agency cost may also be achieved through higher managerial ownership as it creates alignment of interests between managers and shareholders (Morck et al. [39] ). However, in the situation of greater managerial ownership, managers may act in discretion for utilisation of the surplus generated and may take steps to prolong their stay in the firm (even if it is not justified from value creation perspective termed as managerial entrenchment by Shleifer and Vishny [40] ) because of disproportionate power available to them. Thus, the value creation through increased managerial ownership will be a trade-off between entrenchment effect and alignment effect (Mishra and Kapil [38] ).
Promoter(s) in general is (are) person(s) who are involved in incorporation and organization of a corporation. Promoters are an important part of companies in Indian context, as most of the companies are of family origin. In India, promoter ownership is also related with promoter control (Kumar and Singh [41] ). Certain studies highlighted that often, promoters find themselves making strong representation in the board (Ganguli [42] However, if their stakes are beyond a threshold level, where they would be in a position to exploit minority shareholders, then, there would be a decrease in firm value (Richter and Chakraborty [43] ; Ohadi et al. [44] ; Sahu [45] ; Kakani et al. [46] ). Because of being majority control owner managers may prolong their stay in the firm even if it is not desired from technical/managerial point of view (Anderson and Reeb [47] ; Morck et al. [39] ).
Among theoretical studies there is no consistency between the direction of relationship between insider ownership and corporate performance. Convergent of interest hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling [48] ; McConnell and Servaes [49] ;
Oswald and Jahera [50] ; Hudson et al. [51] ; Chung and Pruitt [52] ; Chang [53] ) says that with increased stake of insiders, the interest of insiders would converge with value creation for company. On the other hand, conflict of interest hypothesis (Jensen and Ruback [54] ; Fan and Wong [55] ) says that with increased stake, insiders would be in a position to extract benefits more than their proportional share. In some of the studies, relationship between corporate performance and insider ownership has been found non-linear (Morck et al. [39] ) or of inverted U-shaped (McConnell and Servaes [49] ; Barnhart and Rosenstein [56] ;
Chen et al. [57] ). [60] ). This is due to application of developed country standards of corporate governance, mandated by the investors that own private equity funds. These funds are primarily owned by investors from de- Shukeri et al. [63] ; Fauzi and Locke [64] ). The relationship between corporate performance and board size is impacted by two competing aspects; first, slow decision making process under large board and second, a large board providing more linkages to resources and stakeholders (in external environment) and wide experience. Some of the empirical studies indicate positive relation between board size and profitability (Abor and Biekpe [65] ); and between board size and return on assets, earnings per share, and market-to-book ratio (Sheikh et al. [66] ), whereas others indicated non-linear relationship between board size and earnings management (Alves [67] ). Studies in Indian context found small board more effective in enhancing firm value (Kota and Tomar [32] ) and indicated a negative relationship between board size and firm value (Kumar and Singh, [41] ).
Based on Above Discussion We Propose Following Hypothesis
Indian Companies Act 2013 [clause 149(1) of Chapter XI] says that every company shall have a Board of Directors consisting of individuals as directors and shall have-1) a minimum number of three directors in the case of a public company, two directors in the case of a private company, and one director in the case of a One Person Company; and 2) a maximum of fifteen directors. A company may appoint more than fifteen directors after passing a special resolution.
The act also stipulates that such class or classes of companies as may be prescribed shall have at least one woman director and every company shall have at least one director who has stayed in India for a total period of not less than one hundred and eighty-two days in the previous calendar year.
There is an inverse relationship between board size and firm performance measured by Tobin's Q (Yermack [68] ; Eisenberg et al. [69] ), because of lack of (6) of Chapter XI] also says: an independent director in relation to a company, means a director other than a managing director or a whole-time director or a nominee director,-meeting with some other criteria specified therein including he/she must not be related to promoters or directors in the company, its holding, subsidiary or associate company; and has or had no pecuniary relationship with the company, its holding, subsidiary or associate company, or their promoters, or directors, during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year.
Independent directors are invited on the board to oversee management on behalf of shareholders and their higher proportion on the board may lead to superior financial performance (Baysinger and Butler [73] ) and greater firm value (Mak and Kusandi [74] ). Outside directors were found to be impacting firm value positively (Black and Kim [75] ). However, many studies have found that the proportion of independent directors or grey directors has no significant impact on form performance (Ehikioya [18] ; Yammeesri and Herath [76] ; Gill [77] ). On the contrary some studies (e.g. Sheikh et al. [66] ) indicate that outside directors are negatively related to firm performance measures like return on assets, earnings per share, and market-to-book ratio.
However, considering the significant development taken place in India in the [78] ). Board members' commitment, are far more important than board demographics for predicting board task performance (Minichilli et al. [79] ). The commitment of the board members will depend upon their involvement in the meeting which refers to their effort during discussions and in the follow-up of the decisions taken during the board meetings (Judge and Zeithaml [80] ). Involvement also includes board members' willingness and ability to advance useful questions and to intervene constructively in the board decision making process. Additionally, for making their involvement the board members' must be prepared for the board meeting which refers to their willingness and ability to participate in board meetings with a deep knowledge of the topics to be discussed in order to actively contribute to the decision making process. Hence, number of board meetings and effective participation of board of directors in those meetings are expected to impact firm performance positively.
Board of directors achieve monitoring through board meetings, hence number of board meetings is a good proxy for the monitoring effects of directors (Vafeas [81] ). Vafeas [81] demonstrated that boards meet more often during periods of turmoil, and that boards meeting more often show improved financial performance. A board that meets more often should be able to devote more time to issues such as earnings management. A board that seldom meets may not focus on these issues and may perhaps only rubber-stamp management plans. Lipton and
Lorsch [70] suggested that the greater frequency of meetings is likely to result in superior performance. Hence, above leads to following hypothesis:
H6: Positive linkage between board meeting and firm performance
There are two contrasting theoretical arguments regarding impact of board leadership structure on firm performance. Steward theorists advocate managers as good stewards of company resources (Davis et al. [82] ), accordingly there is no perceived conflict of interest between shareholders and the managers. Hence, combining the roles of CEO and chairperson of the board into a single person i.e. CEO duality is expected to provide strong leadership and unified strategic direction to the firm that may lead into better performance.
However, as per agency theorists responsibility of CEO is to execute the company policies and to run the company where as the responsibility of the chairperson of the board is to monitor and evaluate managerial activities (Lam and Lee [83] ). The board is also responsible for the process of hiring, firing, evaluating and compensating the CEO. Hence, separating the two roles "avoids concentration of authority and power in one individual and differentiates leadership of the board from running of the business" (Higgs [84] ). It is further argued that CEO duality will lead to domination of board by that person, making the board ineffective in monitoring managerial opportunism (Jensen [85] ) and the chairperson should preferably not be the same person (i.e. CEO) whose performance is being assessed (Jensen [85] ). CEO duality provides much CEO duality has been found to have significant positive impact on profitability (Abor and Biekpe [85] ) and is found to be positively related to earnings per share (Sheikh et al. [66] ; Hassan and Halbouni [87] ). On the contrary, some studies have also been found that CEO duality impacts firm performance adversely (Ehikioya [18] ). CEO duality lead to higher incidence disclosure, suggesting increased scrutiny works (Collett and Dedman [88] [96] ).
Ferris et al. [97] has termed directors holding position of directors in multiple companies in terms of busyness hypothesis. Multiple directorships permit a firm to use its directors to form or solidify advantageous contracting relations with other firms, such as important suppliers or customers (Ferris et al. [97] ). However, individuals holding more outside board seats have less time to spend serv- In this study, external busyness of directors has been measured in terms of average number of directorship and committee positions held in other companies by the directors of the company. In this regard some studies (e.g. Fich and
Shivdasani [98] ) view that a large number of appointments make directors over committed which leads to compromise over monitoring function affecting firm value adversely.
Studies have also found that directors with multiple appointments have positive impact on firm performance (Harris and Shimizu [99] ; Ferris et al. [97] ).
This is based on the presumption that they have networks and corporations would benefit by accessing these resources (Booth and Deli [100] ). In studies done in Indian context, it has been pointed out that occurrence of multiple directorship is also because of supply constraint in directors market, owing to lack of industrial leadership and adequacy of experience (Jackling and Johl [21] ).
Family control of business groups leads to directorship position held under kinship and social ties (Khanna and Rivkin [101] [111] ; Kumar and Singh [41] ). Tobin's Q is calculated as the market value of common stock and preferred stock plus book value of debt divided by the book value of assets.
Return on asset (ROA), an accounting based performance measure has also been used by many researchers (Demsetz and Villalonga [112] ; Finch and Shivadasani [98] , Thomsen et al. [113] ). ROA is defined as ratio of after tax net operating income and the total operating assets (Copeland et al. [114] ). Net operating income is computed as the operating earnings before income and taxes, before extra-ordinary items and prior adjustment. Prowess database of CMIE has an item called PBDITA (profit before depreciation interest and tax prior to extra-ordinary items). It has been used as a proxy for net operating income. Return on Equity (ROE), an accounting based performance measure has also been used by many researchers (Arora and Sharma [115] ; Ayuso et al. [116] , Vito and Bozec [107] ; Sheikh et al. [66] ; Crespi [117] ; Drokos and Bekiris 2010; Jackling and Johl [21] ; Guest [118] ; Lam and Lee [83] ; Beiner et al. [119] ). ROE is defined as ratio operating profit before depreciation and amortization divided by total equity.
Demsetz and Villalonga [112] argue that although the numerator of Tobin's Q partly reflects the value that investors assign to a company's intangible assets, the denominator does not include investment the company has in intangible assets, and market forecasts (Reddy et al. [120] ). For this reason we have used both types of performance measures in the study (Table 1) .
Independent Variables
Corporate governance variables are considered as independent variables. Variables used in the study and their measures are indicated in Table 2 .
Data Analysis
In this study data analysis is conducted with AMOS 21, a software package that estimates structural models with latent variables based on variance-covariance matrix. The causal modelling procedure followed in SEM is suitable to test the hypothesized model as the method considers multiple path coefficients simultaneously to allow analysis of direct, indirect and spurious relationship among variables and the technique estimates individual weightings of each observed variable in the context of theoretical model rather than in isolation. The model accommodates latent variables, measurement errors and inter-construct residual error, as well as reciprocal causation, simultaneity and interdependence (Capron et al. [121] ). However, SEM requires a-priori formal specification of model and Table 3 .
Based on literature review a-priori formal specification of model is indicated in Figure 1 .
For understanding the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance following four models have been analyzed in this study: Comparative fit index (CFI) > 0.9
Normed fit index (NFI) > 0.9
Tucker Lewis fit index (TLI) > 0.9
3 Parsimonious model fit Minimum discrepancy = (Chi square/df) < 5 Figure 1 . Formal specification of model.
Result
The descriptive analysis and correlation of the data are presented in Table 4 . From the result presented in Table 5 From the result presented in Table 6 it is indicated that the model fit is acceptable under all the three acceptance criteria viz. absolute model fit, incremental model fit and parsimonious model fit.
Testing of Hypotheses
Promoter ownership (ProOwn), FII ownership (FIIOwn) and institutional ownership (InstOwn) are positively and significantly impacting market based performance measure Tobin's Q and not impacting accounting based performance measure (ROA and ROE) significantly.
Size of the board is impacting positively and significantly the performance From the result presented in Table 7 it is indicated the model fit is acceptable under all three acceptance criteria viz. absolute model fit, incremental model fit and parsimonious model fit.
Latent construct ownership is positively and significantly impacted by all the Ownership is impacting Tobin's Q positively and significantly and also ROA positively and significantly (at 5%) and not impacting ROE significantly. From the result presented in Table 8 it is indicated that the model fit is acceptable 
Discussion
Ownership is found positively and significantly affecting performance variables supported for market based performance measure. Hence, it is indicated that when directors hold too may outside positions, they become overburdened and their involvement in monitoring function of the board decreases leading to decreased firm performance. This is in line with Sarkar and Sarkar [126] who found multiple directorships by inside directors negatively related to firm performance.
Conclusions
This study explores the relationship between corporate governance structure and firm performance measured by Tobin's Q, ROA and ROE. The results suggest that corporate governance variables affect market based performance measures (Tobin's Q) more in comparison to accounting based performance measures (ROA and ROE). Out of two governance mechanisms studied in the research for their impact on corporate performance, ownership structure appears to impact market based performance measure more whereas board structure appears to impact accounting based performance measure more. Impact on corporate performance is maximum for promoter ownership followed by FII ownership and then of institutional ownership among various ownership variables. Among board variables, board size is found to impact performance positively and CEO duality is found to impact performance negatively. Board independence is found to impact positively accounting based performance only, whereas the number of board meetings is found to impact positively market based performance measure only.
Directors' internal busyness is not found to impact any of the performance measures. As far as directors' external busyness is concerned, it is impacting accounting based measures negatively when the busyness is measured in terms of position of directors in other companies. Firm size is found to impact performance negatively.
In general, firm age is found to impact accounting based performance measure positively and not impacting market based performance measure. Leverage is impacting performance measures Tobin's Q and ROA negatively; however, it impacts ROE positively.
This study is a comprehensive addition to the body of existing studies on corporate governance specifically in Indian context. The dataset for corporate governance attributes and firm performance is quite comprehensive and contemporary.
The empirical findings supported agency theory and resource dependency theory and validated that the corporate governance variables impact corporate performance. It has also been found that the relationship between corporate governance variables and corporate performance is also dependent upon the type of performance measure selected.
This study has implications for policy makers, academicians and investors since findings indicate impact of specific corporate governance variable on corporate financial performance. The study is important for both domestic and for- The study reiterates the belief that board meeting dynamics impact the corporate governance structure and mechanism. These dynamics and Another area of interest for researchers may be corporate governance mechanisms common to emerging economies. Analytical frameworks for the same may be developed. This may help in developing some kind of predictive model for understanding future performance based on present corporate governance practice for emerging economies.
As corporate governance mechanism undergoes redefinition with time future research scope becomes vast and more critical in terms of variables of corporate governance, estimating corporate governance model and the firm performance variables. In future research, any potential interrelationships between corporate governance practices and contextual variables can also be taken into account.
